Still other courts consider that decisions of a trial judge on questions of mixed fact and law, as well as on purely factual issues, can only be set aside on appeal if they are manifestly erroneous. For example, G.J. Leasing Co. v. Union Electric Co., 1995 WL 257885 (7th Cir. May 4, 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (« serious error of the applicant » by alleging that « the appellate review of the district judge`s decision on questions of mixed law and fact is carried out in plenary »); With respect to Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc., 50 F.3d 72, 73 (1st Cir. 1995) (« the question of mixed law and fact is subject to the manifestly erroneous standard unless the bankruptcy court`s analysis was « vitiated by errors of law »); With respect to Wes Dor, Inc., 996 F.2d 237, 241 (10th Cir. 1993) (if the question relates primarily to an investigation of the facts, the Court applies the manifestly erroneous standard); In re Smith, 180 B.R. 648, 651 n.10 (D.

Utah 1995) (when considering questions of mixed law and fact, which involve primarily an examination of the facts, the court applies the manifestly erroneous standard); S&P, Inc. v. Pfeifer, 189 B.R. 173, 179 (N.D. Ind. 1995). (« Mixed questions of fact and law are also considered under the « manifestly erroneous » standard. »). Mixed questions of law and fact are defined as « issues where historical facts are recognized or established, the rule of law is resolved, and the question is whether the facts meet the legal standard or, in other words, whether or not the law as it applies to established facts is violated. » [Bausch & Lomb v. United States, 21 C.I.T. 166, 169 (Ct.

International Trade 1997)]. (2) In some jurisdictions, a question relating to the determination and/or interpretation of foreign law in a case. A party who wishes to invoke a foreign right must prove it like any other fact that has not been noticed in court. In some jurisdictions, a question of fact relating to the determination and/or interpretation of foreign law is resolved by a jury or, in court proceedings, by a judge. The standard for granting a discretionary stay is similar to the standard for injunctions and requires consideration of four factors: (a) the likelihood of success in the appeal process; (b) the prospect of irreparable harm to the travelling party if the remedy is denied; (c) the possibility of harm to other parties if remedies are granted; and (c) if the suspension is detrimental to the public interest. See In re First Sav. Ass`n, 820 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1987); With respect to Delaware and Hudson R.R., 90 B.R. 90, 91 (Bankr.

D. Del. 1988). See, for example, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (on questions of fact generally) and Griffin v. Mark Travel Corp., 724 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. Ct.

App. 2006) (concerning foreign law). Abuse of authority can be described as: « What we mean when a court has abused its discretion is simply that we think [the court] made an error. » Pearson v. Dennison, 353 F.2d 24, 28 n.6 (9th Cir. 1965); agreement In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1995) (abuse of authority occurs where the reviewing court « is clearly and firmly satisfied that the subsequent tribunal made a manifest error of assessment in concluding after weighing the relevant factors »); Corp., 42 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1994) (« There is abuse of authority when the Court of Review is firmly satisfied that an error has been made. »). There may be an abuse of authority if (1) the court fails to « effectively. exercise discretion and decide instead as a general rule or even arbitrarily; 2. The Court does not take into account the relevant facts which `restrict` the exercise of its discretion.

or (3) its decision is based on incorrect legal or factual findings. United States v. Roberson, 188 B.R. 364, 365 (D. Md. 1995) (citing James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1993)), or incorrect application of the law to fact, see, for example, In re Gioioso, 979 F.2d 956, 959 (3d Cir. 1992); Karl v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 776 (7th Cir.

1980); Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853, 857 (6th Cir. 1956); see generally Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (the court of first instance abuses its discretion when its decision is « based on an erroneous interpretation of the law or on a manifestly erroneous assessment of the evidence »); Jeffrey v. Desmond, 70 F.3d 183 (1st cir. 1995). (« The barrel that wraps a judge`s discretion may be spacious, but it can be broken if an appellate court is satisfied that the trial court has misunderstood or misunderstood the law or misinterpreted its own rules. »); Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796, 802 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 p.

Ct. 320 (1994) (« The standard of abuse of authority is satisfied only if the trial judge`s decision is based on an erroneous finding of law, or if the minutes contain no evidence on which the trial judge could rationally base that decision, or if the alleged facts established are manifestly erroneous. »); Zolfo, Cooper & Co.