Non-hereditary rights die with the death of their owner. Example: Not all personality rights are hereditary. The permissible standard of action in a certain area is called rights. In other words, a right is any act of a person that the law allows. Legal rights differ from a moral or natural right in that it is recognized and protected by law, while the latter may/may be recognized and protected by law. We will now discuss the types of rights in detail. Not all philosophers agree that rights can be fully analyzed. White (1984), for example, argued that the task is impossible because the concept of one right is as fundamental as any of the others, such as duty, liberty, power, etc. (or a set of these) in which it is usually analyzed.

However, he agreed that the rights could be explained in part by reference to those concepts. White`s approach, which relies largely on precise linguistic analysis, remains in the minority. Dworkin (1973, 1975, 1981, 1986) was a representative of the first point of view in a formulation of his legal theory. Consequently, rights have a categorical primacy over any other consideration that is not itself legally justified. Of course, it is true in many legal systems that constitutional rights, or some of them, should take precedence over any other consideration that does not itself flow from a constitutional right. But this seems to be mainly due to the constitutional status of the law. Both in law and morality, many rights are rather trivial. In morality, these rights can sometimes even be justified by considerations of personal comfort (cf. Raz 1978). Similarly, it appears in the legislation that many prima facie rights can be overridden by what the court considers to be public interest considerations.

Dworkin`s (1977) response to the latter type of criticism was to argue that, on closer inspection, the examination of opposition to the law can itself be seen as instantiating another common law. However, this depends on the controversial assertion that the only considerations on which the courts can legitimately rely are pre-existing rights. It was also objected that, as a general theory of the nature of rights, it might be self-destructive, since then any consideration could be considered to be based on law, which meant that rights did not have a particular role in practical argumentation. (For a discussion of Dworkin`s theory, including its other formulations, see Yowell 2007.) Instead, most authors argued that rights should be analyzed in other, more fundamental terms, primarily duty, permission, and power, perhaps with the addition of other criteria. This means that not all rights will be of great importance. Their importance depends on the strength of the reasons of duty, permission, or power. Before examining these reports more closely, it is worth mentioning another point. Theorists are divided between those who believe that rights are, so to speak, the « reflex » of duty, permission, or power, and those who believe that the law takes precedence over them. The question is whether duty, etc.

establishes the right or whether the law establishes duty. Most older authors (e.g. Bentham, Austin, Hohfeld, Kelsen) seem to have adhered to the first point of view, while more recent authors (e.g. MacCormick, Raz, Wellman) adopt the second point of view. The second view implies that the force of a right is not necessarily exhausted by an existing set of duties, etc., that flow from it, but may be a reason for the creation of new obligations as circumstances change. The latter view, at least, seems to be more consistent with the operation of constitutional legal claims. Civil rights are those that are not related to the establishment, support, or administration of government. These consist of the power to acquire and enjoy property, to exercise paternal and matrimonial power, etc.

It will be observed that if everyone is not deprived of it by a civil sentence of death, he enjoys his civil rights, which is not the case with political rights; For a foreigner, for example, has no political rights, although he fully enjoys his civil rights. The powers also illustrate a general problem in the analysis of legal claims and arguably rights in general. Namely, whether an element is to be regarded as forming part of the essence of the concept of right or whether it is merely an element of what its content is (conditionally), that is to say, what a right exists or is to be obtained. Another particular type of legal claims, or groups of rights, that has received increasing attention from theorists is that of property rights. The discussion about this belongs more to that of the property itself – see the entry on the property. Only a few brief remarks are made here. The first question is whether property rights, and thus the notion of property, are essentially legal in nature or whether they are more general social phenomena that are simply recognized and legally protected in all modern societies. According to Bentham (1843) ». There is no natural property. Property is entirely the creature of the law. Bentham`s argument is essentially that what we mean by property is the security of expecting to keep, sell, use, etc.

objects, and only the law can guarantee such security. Relative rights are public or private: the former are those that exist between the people and the government, such as the right to the protection of the people and the right of loyalty to the government; The second is the mutual rights of husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, master and servant. The position of many important authors on legal rights is difficult to determine on this point because it has not been addressed directly. Hohfeld (1919), for example, limited his discussion entirely to legal rights and never mentioned moral rights. Hart wrote about moral rights (1955, 1979) and legal rights (1973, 1994), but not in a way that allows for direct comparison. Bentham (1970 [1782]) wrote extensively on the analysis of legal rights, but famously thought that the idea of natural moral rights was conceptual nonsense. More recent versions, such as those by Raz (1984a, 1984b), take a completely different approach. In their view, the assertion that X is the holder of rights means that its interests or any aspect thereof constitute sufficient grounds for imposing obligations on others, either not to interfere with X in the performance of an act or to secure it in something. Among other things, it is the largest city in the world. circumvent the problem of the rights of third parties, because the explanation is simply that everything is a question of whether the system recognizes the interests of Z as part of the reason for the obligations of X and Y or whether it is only the interests of X and Y.