*839 In light of our decision to place this case in pre-trial detention, it is necessary that we briefly address some additional disputes between the parties. Selig argues that the trial court cannot require a defendant to support an application for deletion with affidavits of fact and legal statements. He argues that this improperly shifts the burden of proof to a defendant who seeks to suppress illegally obtained evidence, which violates federal law. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604, 95 p. Ct. 2254, 2262, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975); Lego vs. Twomey, 404 U.S.

477, 92 p. Ct. 619, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1972); see also Hatch v. State, 544 p.2d 834 (Alaska 1975). In the present case, the Court of First Instance issued a pre-trial order approximately forty-five days before the trial date. [6] The order expressly required compliance with civil rule 77. It clearly fulfilled the reporting obligations set out in Weidner, 715 pp.2d to 268. The Court of First Instance could have considered that Selig`s late attempts to comply with the rule would not have resolved the issues without delaying the trial. Such a statement would justify the refusal to release Selig from losing the problem of oppression. Wortham v.

State, 689 p.2d, pp. 1137-38. In addition to the presumed test sites that appear on the site map and community table, there is also a list of approved additional test sites in Administrative Bulletin 27. As explained in Criminal Rule 18(e), a defendant may ask the court to move the trial to one of these locations if it is July 7. In April 1987, Selig filed a motion through a lawyer to « suppress all statements by the accused, all evidence seized by the police regarding the above case, breath samples or test results thereof. and all the evidence that is the result of it. In support of the motion, he argued the following: However, when he appeared at the trial, Selig`s lawyer apparently argued before the Court of First Instance that he had never received a copy of the order and that he had not understood that he was required to comply with civil rule 77 when he filed his requests for repression. He explicitly stated that he had no idea why they were deficient and why Judge Blair had denied them.

In addition, he expressly denied having received the State`s opposition to his requests, which called into question the adequacy of his requests, and requested that the scheduled hearing be suspended. (k) Where an application is based on facts that are not recorded, the court may hear the case on the basis of affidavits or other evidence provided by the parties concerned, but may order that the case be heard in whole or in part on the basis of statements or testimony. Alaska`s Penal Rules 12 and 16 require a defendant to seek a pre-trial resolution of requests to suppress illegally obtained evidence. Alaska law gives the trial court broad discretion to determine the procedures to be followed to resolve such claims. Weidner v. Superior Court, 715 p.2d 264 (Alaska App. 1986). [4] In this case, Selig probably complied with criminal rule 42.

It did not comply with Civil Rule 77, which requires the moving party to make a stand-alone presentation. A motion under rule 77 should be accompanied by the specific remedy sought and should be accompanied by an affidavit setting out all the relevant facts known to the defendant and his witnesses, as well as a legal brief applying the law to those facts, stating that, if the factual allegation is true, the defendant: is entitled to the appeal sought. *837 Selig`s defense lawyer appealed to the court against the admission of statements made by Selig at the time of his arrest on the grounds that no Miranda warning had been given. The trial court allowed the defense lawyer to insult Agent Maitland before the court`s decision on the appeal. The defense lawyer also objected to the introduction of the videotape with Selig`s confession, claiming that Selig had not waived his Miranda rights. Finally, the defence lawyer objected to the approval of the results of the 3000 intoxicatmeter test carried out on Selig on the ground that Selig had not been observed within the required period of twenty minutes. The Court of First Instance rejected the objections. Selig and his lawyer appeared at the hearing the next day. Justice Slater apparently replaced Justice Crutchfield. Selig`s lawyer pointed out to Judge Slater that several applications had been filed and rejected and that sanctions had been imposed. He felt that he had no idea what he had done wrong, suggesting that he had not noticed that the court of first instance intended to apply civil rule 77 in his case. Neither Slater J.

nor Blair J. explicitly ruled on Selig`s request for reconsideration. [3] However, Slater J. told the court that he had discussed the matter informally with Blair J. and that Blair J. did not intend to reconsider his decision. The Alaska Civil Jury Instructions and alaska Civil Model Jury Instructions are available online on the court`s website. Alaska Civil Pattern jury instructions are also available in print form from the law libraries of the State Court of Anchorage, Fairbanks and Juneau in Alaska. These instructions have not been approved or promulgated by any court or the Alaska Bar Association. (3) An appropriate order for the court`s signature if the application is accepted.

Gregory W. Selig was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of AS 28.35.030. He appealed, arguing that the Trial Court erred in summarily rejecting his requests to remove certain evidence without a hearing. We take into account other factual findings of the Court of First Instance in pre-trial detention. We agree with courts that extend this revocation rule to cases where an application is made in a timely manner, but are not substantially consistent with the applicable procedural rules, so the matter cannot be resolved before the proceedings without interruption of the hearing date or other significant interference in the prosecution. See Annas v. State, 726 pp.2d 552, 558 (Alaska App. 1986) (Rule 12(e)*838 allows the trial court to refuse to continue to collect evidence for a pre-trial application if the trial is delayed); State vs. Miller, 17 Gold. App.

352, 521 P.2d 1330 (1974), aff`d 269 Or. 328, 524 P.2d 1399 (1974) (violation of the local rule requiring an affidavit accompanying an application for repression justifies the dismissal of the application); State v Holloway, 311 N.C. 573, 319 p.E.2d 261 (1984) (The defendant waives the right to repression because he did not attach an affidavit stating the reasons for the oppression). But see Holloway v. Woodard, 655 F. Supp. 1245 (W.D.N.C. 1987) (with the habeas corpus application on the ground that the application of the revocation rule on the particular facts of this case serves no purpose other than to preclude the assertion of federal law). See generally 1 W. LaFave & J.

Israel, Criminal Procedure § 10.1(b) to 782 (1984). The Alaska Rules of Justice are the rules for the administration of all state courts and for the practice and procedure in civil and criminal matters established by the Supreme Court under the authority of the Alaska Constitution. The Supreme Court has also issued rules for the practice of law in Alaska and rules of procedure for cases relating to children, probate and appeals. Selig`s assertion that he did not receive the communication requested by Weidner, as well as the writer`s certificate that she had sent a message to the parties, raise facts. See Hartsfield v Carolina Casualty Company, 411 P.2d 396, 399-400 (Alaska 1966), after remand 451 p.2d 576 (Alaska 1969) (refusal to receive the communication is a contentious question of fact concerning the sending of a communication). Since prior notification of the procedures to be followed is a condition for their enforcement by the imposition of penalties, in particular the refusal to examine the applications, it necessarily follows that the Court of First Instance was required to take evidence which was limited at least to the question of selig`s notification of the decision at issue. See Adams v. State, 704 P.2d 794, 797 (Alaska App. 1985) (if a conflict consists of evidence of a material fact relevant to the resolution of a motion for suppression, the trial court must hold a hearing of evidence to resolve that conflict and cannot rely on Alaska Civil Rule 77 to settle the dispute on the basis of documentary evidence). At the end of the hearing, the court was required to make specific findings of fact in order to resolve the issue at issue. Burks v.

State, 706 pp.2d 1190, 1191 (Alaska App. 1985). Since it does not appear that the Court of First Instance ever specifically clarified the question whether Selig received notification that it must comply with Civil Rule 77 when bringing its applications for annulment, it is appropriate to set aside the decision to dismiss the case and to refer the case back to the Court of First Instance for a further hearing. [7] If an accused does not seek a pre-trial solution to the repression issues in a timely manner in order to avoid interrupting the trial date or otherwise affecting the indictment, he or she may be considered to have lost the right to appeal the evidence. Criminal Rule 12(e)[5]; Best v. Community Anchorage, 749 p.2d 375 (Alaska App. 1988); Wortham v. State, 689 p.2d 1133 (Alaska App. 1984); Fox vs.

State, 685 p.2d 1267 (Alaska App. 1984). If applications are not made in a timely manner, but are made sufficiently in advance of trial to allow for their resolution without disrupting the trial or affecting prosecutions, it is an abuse of discretion not to resolve them and, if necessary, to impose other sanctions to enforce the rules. Fox, 685 P.2d, pp. 1270-71. (1) Legible copies of all photographs, affidavits and other evidence that the moving party intends to provide in support of the mover`s application; Criminal Rule 18 explains how the jurisdiction card of the judicial system (4.03 MB) is used to determine the place where the trial of an accused will take place. The application was not supported by an affidavit or brief of law. [1] At *836 at the same time, counsel filed a « request for counsel for the date and time of the hearing, » apparently on a form provided by the court.

In which it is indicated for « the dates in which the case must be decided in order to comply with the rules of the court », Selig`s lawyer requested that « at the earliest 24.04.87 ». Accordingly, the court scheduled a repressive hearing before Judge Crutchfield on May 1, 1987.